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Technological Change & War’s Nature

Profession at the Crossroads
Lieutenant Colonel Donn A. Starry
The late General Donn A. Starry (1925–2011), former Commanding
General of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (1977–
81), wrote this insightful essay in 1966 while he was attending the
US Army War College. It offers an engaging look at how the US
Army profession viewed itself in the late 1960s. It also reveals how
officers, many as talented as Starry, viewed the “nature of war”
in an era of tremendous technological and socio-cultural change.
Note how Starry wrote of war as potentially shifting “from total,
to limited, to back to total in a completely different sense.” Can
the US Army of today manage such a shift as fluidly as it might be
required to do?

A

s competing worlds seek to expand and promote their respective
ideologies under the nuclear shadow, the very nature of war
itself changes, and with this change come different notions
about the purpose of military force, proper military strategy and tactics,
and the correct goals for military action in the new international arena.
On all sides, there is increasing concern with national security, with the
involvement of civilians in military strategy, and the place of the military
in political affairs. In reflecting this concern, political scientists reanalyze
civil-military relations; social scientists examine the military profession;
business managers and scientists propose new decision making and
management disciplines for government and military organizations; and
scientists and academicians propose new strategies for national defense.
So the defense of the United States, and the military profession
itself, long relatively isolated from national affairs except in crisis, are
today experiencing many of the effects of the changing world.

Changing Patterns of Leadership

The story of the American military profession in modern times
has been described by Janowitz as a struggle between the heroic leader,
embodying the tradition of the mounted warrior, and the military
manager, concerned with the rational and scientific conduct of war.
Since the turn of the century, and more especially since World War II,
technological developments have been so comprehensive as to create an
organizational revolution in the military profession.
As war and war machinery have become more complex, the heroic
traditionalism of the military man has taken root in an organizational
conservatism; a resistance to change based largely on the uncertainties of
war, and the imponderables of planning for the employment of untried
technological advances.

Reprinted from
LTC Donn A. Starry,
“Profession at
the Crossroads,”
US Army War
College Commentary
(February 1967): 16–24.
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The increased destructiveness of military weaponry, a contribution
of technology, weakens traditional distinctions between the role of the
military and that of the civilian. Not only do mass destruction weapons
broaden the menace to the country and society by equalizing in a sense
the risk between soldiers and civilians, but complex technical and
logistics tasks also tend to increase the civilian character of the military
establishment. Involvement of military personnel in highly technical
research and development tasks completes the civilianizing trend of the
non-heroic requirements for modern military leadership.
The ultimate requirement for combat, however, provides an outer
limit to these civilianizing tendencies. Among the platoons, companies,
and battalions of combat divisions, the persistence of the fighter spirit
is an essential characteristic of life, So long as this is the case, the
heroic leader image cannot be cast away. On the other hand, as today’s
professional officer moves from command to staff, from field to research
program, he continually is torn between the traditional hero image of
the warrior class, and the manager-technician demands of burgeoning
science and technology in his profession.

Changing Patterns of Decisionmaking

The complex nature of today’s military problems taxes the
capabilities of traditional methods of military analysis and problem
solving. Problems of which weapons systems to develop, how many
of what weapons to buy, and where to deploy what forces involve so
many complex considerations from cost to national policy, that new
decisionmaking tools are required. In response to the need for new
tools, the academic community has provided a set of systematic, and
where possible, quantitative tools for the solution of complex military
management problems.
Involvement of the academic community in the solution of military
problems is one of the significant aspects of recent times. This
involvement grew out of such events as the World War II participation
of scientific groups in development of operational techniques for
employment of radar in air defense.
Not only were new weapons developed and introduced by scientists
and academicians; but the deployment and employment of the weapons
also were subjected to new analysis techniques—matters long considered
solely as problems for the military professional to solve. This work was
known initially as operations analysis—later operations research. As
time went on, operations research techniques were applied to many
management and strategy problems of the military establishment. How
many bombers should be purchased for the new bomber fleet? Which of
two competing missile systems is the better? Should bombers or missiles
be the main defense? Where should air defense interceptor units be
stationed for best utilization? Such work, including not only operational
matters but also costs, the effectiveness of competing systems, and many
other factors, has come to be known as systems analysis.

Technological Change & War’s Nature

Starry

55

As the purely military ingredient of an equation increases, and a
tactical problem of combat is to be solved, systems analysis, as yet, has
limited application. When such factors as terrain advantage, beach and
sea conditions, state of morale, and the training status of troops must
be weighed and a decision reached quickly, systems analysis, at present
at any rate, is too cumbersome to be useful. On the other hand, caution
must be exercised in propounding this viewpoint dogmatically. What
is immeasurable today may be measurable tomorrow. As science learns
more about conflict in war games, game theory studies, the science of
cybernetics, and related activities, new paths will be opened for analytical
treatment of military combat.

The Changing Nature of War

In spite of its violence and horror, war historically has been an
essential institution of relations between states. In particular, the
nation state system has relied on war as the final arbiter between states
that have irreconcilable grievances. Presidents Polk and McKinley
deliberately used war as an instrument of American policy, unpleasant
but necessary. President Wilson, without really planning participation,
became engulfed inextricably in World War I as a foreign policy response.
By Franklin Roosevelt’s time, war had been magnified to awesome
totality; an instrument of defense in the extremity of a total struggle for
national survival.
What then is war today? Is it a useful arbiter among nations? Or is
it a destructive terror to which heads of state no longer will resort even
in extremis? These are some of the questions raised by the presence of
nuclear weapons in modern war.
Almost since the beginning of this century, the American military
professional has regarded war with the same outlook as that of General
Douglas MacArthur when he said:
The general definition which for many decades has been accepted was that
war was the ultimate process of politics; that when all other political means
failed, you then go to force; and when you do that, the balance of control,
the balance of concept, the main interest involved, the minute you reach the
killing stage, is the control of the military. . . . You have got to trust at that
stage of the game when politics fails, and the military takes over, you must
trust the military, or otherwise you will have the system that the Soviet once
employed of the political commissar, who could run the military as well as
the politics of the country.

Total war, resulting from a total failure of the political processes
between states, traditionally has meant total involvement of the military
in the conduct of the war, with the ultimate goal total victory. Again
General MacArthur, this time speaking of victory, said:
Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in
war there is no substitute for victory, that if you [the military professional]
lose, the Nation will be destroyed. . . .
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The author of these classical, traditionally military words was the first
victim of the fact that war’s nature had changed with the introduction
of nuclear weapons. Political reluctance to precipitate national disaster
in nuclear war, among other considerations, limited the geography,
weapons, and operations, and changed the goals of the war in Korea,
not once, but several times in the course of the conflict.
Total war had clear goals—total victory, destruction of the enemy,
the appeal of a crusade; all under military control for military ends.
Virtually all the forces which have motivated modern democracies in
war have tended to sublimate political aims of the conflict to the military
goals of destroying the enemy.
The war that General MacArthur fought in Korea on the other hand,
had other aims, less total, without the appeal of a crusade, changing as
the military situation developed. Furthermore, that war was terminated
inconclusively. Out of the Korean experience, however, came the idea
that war indeed could be limited, that it no longer had to be total in
the traditional sense. With that realization, some deep-rooted prejudices
were swept away.
Scarcely had the new character of war become apparent, when the
nature of war began to change once again. Insurrectionary violence
emerged as the dominant characteristic of conflict. Wars no longer were
fought between states, but within states. Wars between governments
became wars inside governments, inspired by insurrectionary
movements, cliques, parties, and other groups seeking power. These
wars were characterized by a breakdown of the controls of public
administration, outlawism, banditry, terror and assassination, against
which full scale military action was required to achieve control of a
country.
This new kind of war in a sense is total, but in a completely
different sense than before. The war in Indochina virtually was total
to Indochina. The war in Algeria was total to that country—total in
resources, population, and involvement of every facet of the community.
Insurrectionary war, in many respects, is war for the minds of men, war
for control or the organs of local government and administration; a war
of public administration where votes are cast with rifles.
This changing nature of war tugs at the roots of military
professionalism. When war still was thought to be total in the nuclear
sense, dependence on long range bombers and missiles as the primary
instruments of war upset the very basis of traditional military training,
and brought into question the ultimate usefulness of military forces other
than the nuclear delivery forces. Before World War II, the maneuvers
of the destroyer squadron, the armored regiment, and the aircraft wing
credibly could be translated into combat operations. Target practice,
bombing, and fleet maneuvers developed skills whose mastery spelled
victory or defeat in battle. In the total war of the nuclear exchange,
however, an air of unreality and lack of convictions has surrounded
the bomber alert force, and the missile silo crew. They know that their
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weapons will never be used unless the entire political and military
structure of the country has failed in its task.
Korea denied the validity of the great nuclear threat as a lever
in conflicts between states where objectives, goals, and the scope of
military action could be limited, without total destruction on both sides,
and where truly vital national interests (survival) were not at stake. The
role of conventional armed forces in modern war of this kind thus
was confirmed.
In the late 1950s, however, a new concept was introduced. A policy
decision was made that conventional forces would be equally capable
of conventional and nuclear war and that they would be equipped with
small yield nuclear weapons; thus the professional dilemma brought on by
the nuclear weapon reappeared, Training and readiness for conventional
war fully were within the ken of the military profession, but what tactics
and techniques would be required by a nuclear war that was designed
to be less than total in the traditional sense? How was such a war to be
fought? If there was doubt that nuclear weapons of any kind would ever
be used at all, was the requirement for dually capable forces debilitating
conventional strength to achieve an unnecessary duality?
The changing nature of war, from total to limited, back to total in
a completely different sense, all under the shadow of a nuclear threat
that might never materialize, has brought considerable confusion to the
professional viewpoint of what war is supposed to be about.

Changing Concepts of Victory

Total war, in the American tradition, was a military war for military
ends. In the early years of the cold war, however, came a dawning
realization by the American military profession of the inseparability of
political aims from military action, General Omar N. Bradley reflected
this changing awareness when he wrote:
The American Army has also acquired a political maturity it sorely lacked
at the outbreak of World War II. At times during that war we forgot that
wars are fought for the resolution of political conflicts, and in the ground
campaign for Europe we sometimes overlooked political considerations of
vast importance. Today, after several years of cold war, we are intensely
aware that military effort cannot be separated from political objectives.

From a recognition that the nature of the ultimate end of war itself
had changed, came changing concepts of victory. If war was no longer
total, if its goal no longer was to be the annihilation of the enemy, what
then was the meaning of victory? Out of the Korean experience came
certain knowledge that winning a war no longer includes traditional
patterns of clear-cut goals, defeat of the enemy, surrender, and final
victory. The nuclear weapon was the prime contributor to this change.
The rise of insurrectionary war as the modern form of total war
further confuses the issues of war’s aims, and the ultimate meaning of
victory. At the outset the existence of insurrection suggests political
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failure, for if the organs of political control are effective, insurrection
is unlikely to begin. Containment of insurrectionary war within the
bounds of one country only serves to add to the confusion. How does
the American military fight wars to restore political stability in someone
else’s country? If the ultimate goal of the American military is the
defense of the American state, what are the goals of American military
action in insurrectionary wars in other states?
Paradoxically, the American liberal society, long suspicious of
standing armies and the use of military force, has been quick to call on
the military establishment as an instrument of foreign policy to support a national strategy that is designed to contain communism. The
acceptance of this mission has required the military establishment to
become involved in special force structures, special schooling activities,
and above all in operations aimed at achieving governmental stability
in countries that have widely differing social, cultural, economic, and
military value judgments.
The broader challenge is one to liberal society itself, as it struggles
to define more clearly its traditionally ambiguous goals. The ambiguity
in overall goals makes the military task even more difficult. The military
professional, face to face with a real problem in the field, indeed is in a
dilemma. Any kind of victory is difficult to achieve when the criteria for
winning are ambiguous.
As the pattern of insurrectionary war has developed, it increasingly
has become obvious that to be able to wage a war for stability in
public administration the military requires new skills—skills that are
commensurate with these new responsibilities. These skills must reflect
the blending of the political-economic-social-military characteristic of
insurrectionary action. The achievement of objectives in these areas is
a task that liberal democracy heretofore has been reluctant to entrust to
its military forces. Now, however, it demands that the military forces
become involved, and that they win.
A similar development occurred in France. Ambiguity of national
goals, and deep involvement of the military in the non-military demands
of insurrectionary war, led to a deep schism between the French
military and the French state during the Indochinese and Algerian
campaigns. Ultimately, this ambiguity spelled the downfall of the
French military profession, which lacking clear definition of what was
to be won, pursued political, social, psychological, and cultural aims in
the context of the totality of the new war. Eventually, so they felt, the
French military came to see national goals and what was to be won more
clearly than the vacillating French government. The military appealed to
the nation over the government, and lost the appeal. While there were
a great many dissimilarities between the French and American military
professions, thus making it difficult to contemplate the occurrence of a like
situation in American democracy, the French experience highlights the
dangers of ambiguous goals and aims, especially in insurrectionary war.
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Changing Patterns of Strategy and Tactics

When it became certain that nuclear weapons threatened national
survival, the scientific and academic communities quickly became
interested in strategy and tactics for nuclear weapons, and in national
policy consideration surrounding their employment. Arthur Herzog,
a writer on military subjects, quotes an estimate that over 100,000
pieces of literature have been written on the subject of strategy since
the end of World War II. Some of these writings have had a significant
influence on the conduct of national affairs. Indeed, a study by Raymond
L. Wilson, Jr. concludes that a small group of civilian intellectuals
significantly influenced virtually all national defense policy decisions of
the Kennedy Administration.
As might be expected, strategies proposed in these writings reflect
a wide divergence of absolute opinion from pacifism and disarmament
to preemptive war. They also reflect increased difficulty in separating
national strategy from military strategy, and demonstrate that many
segments of society, other than military, have become involved in a
field formerly considered to be exclusively military. While the military
may view civilian intrusion with alarm, the civilian looks upon
military involvement in national policymaking with equal suspicion.
Nevertheless, in terms of its size, cost, and its interrelation with almost
every aspect of public affairs, the American military establishment now
is in an unprecedented peacetime situation. It inextricably is involved in
contributing to policymaking for the nation.
Liberal society clearly recognizes the new position and influence of
the military. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., one of liberalism’s most articulate
spokesmen, expressed civilian reaction in this fashion:
We are very much aware of an increased military influence in our national
life. . . . The novelty today lies not in having professional generals venture
forth as free lances in political campaigns, but in having them as established
authorities on policy, accepted in the highest national councils and held
accountable in the most solemn national debates. . . . But in quantity and
quality, the power and prestige of the generals constitute a new phenomenon.
We have among us today, in short, a new political elite, whose future is likely
to have a considerable effect on the future of the republic.

Size, capabilities, and deployment of the nation’s military forces also
have become day-by-day concerns of the diplomat; a fact that is causing
the diplomat and the military to draw closer together. The political
liberal, however, sees military participation in the shaping of national
policy as inimical to the American political tradition. From this feeling
flows a further question as to the competence of the military man in the
broader aspects of political and military policy. What of the military’s
traditional, conservative, rigid “military mind”? Can it adapt to the
less precise parameters of political-military decisionmaking? Again
Schlesinger provides a clear expression of the civilian concern:
The quality of the military mind is hard to define. But it clearly has an
extraordinary innocence. It approaches every question as if no one else had
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ever tackled it before; it seeks to subdue every problem with military logic;
it has no reserves of overtone or undertone. The answer to everything . . . is
to estimate a situation and then take action. Everything is seen too clearly;
and the complexities of history fall by the wayside. Above all, the military
approach has trouble with the problem of ultimate goals; for life is something
more than set problems in strategy. Under conditions of total war, the
defense of the United States implies a whole series of value judgments on
questions of economics, policy, and morality.

Aside from the concern of liberal society, Schlesinger’s words
highlight a concomitant problem for the military professional. Military
science is a discipline in which skill is acquired by training and experience;
its execution demands a decisiveness of action that is not required in any
other discipline. The military professional usually is faced with a task
that somehow has to be accomplished. To do it, he relies on a fairly reflex
set of reasoned responses which, if not intellectually the best, quite often
pragmatically are correct. There is no time to ponder abstractions at
length in the fashion of the intellectual. Practical insistence on problem
solution, to which Schlesinger refers, was born of necessity, not of
intellectual poverty.
When he becomes involved in formulation of state policy, the military
professional faces a whole new set of values which in a sense erode his
conviction of the correctness of his military point of view. Huntington
avers that “politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and
the participation of military officers in politics undermines their
professionalism.” On the other hand, the real world about him has
involved the military professional in just that sort of activity, and from
it he cannot remain aloof. In the field, he is exposed to economic and
social problems in a way best expressed by Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., in these words:
The military [mind] today . . . has to be able to think in terms of training
missions the world over, a more complicated problem than is faced by any
other profession because he may be training at one time in South America,
at another time in the Far East, and at still another in Africa or in Europe.
He [the military professional] has got to know more than most economists
in terms of international economics, and he must know village politics, and
he must know the history of regions, theology of peoples, what motivates
them, what they think about; he must know what they want to be so that he
can help them. . . .

And in a broader view of the same problem President Kennedy
charged the military profession in these terms:
You [military professionals] must know something about strategy and
tactics and logic . . . economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You
must know everything you can about military power, and you must also
understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of
the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been solved
by military power alone. . . . You must be more than servants of national
policy, you must be prepared to play a constructive role in the development
of national policy, a policy which protects our interests and our society and
the peace of the world.
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Thus, the civilian intrudes into a field once considered purely
military, and the military professional is called in to sit in councils that
are debating social, economic, and political issues. This innovation
forces him to develop a new depth and breadth of perception about
his profession, his traditions, and his nation. Finally, in his new role of
economic, social, political, and military adviser at levels from the seat
of government to the primitive village, the professional must seek new
strategies, new tactics, and new doctrines to meet the conditions that he
finds in each place.

The Road Ahead

Is the American military professional ethic that was developed in
the late nineteenth century out of date for the last half of the twentieth?
Fundamental as it was, reflecting a long period of thought and
introspection, the American pre-nuclear military ethic probably was as
useful and valid in 1945 as it was in 1914 on the eve of World War I. From
nuclear weapons to the management of defense, however, science and
technology in recent years have generated conditions which challenge
the traditional role of the military in American society.
On the other hand, whatever its shortcomings may have been, the
traditional military code still meets two essential requirements: first,
it provides the rationale and disciplines for successful combat with an
enemy on the field of battle; second, its underlying sense of devotion
to a cause provides the motivation for men to seek and remain with
the profession in the absence of traditional total war, performing often
odious and increasingly hazardous tasks often for only token reward. If
we are to construct a new philosophy—an ethic for the future, it must
continue to meet these two requirements.
The traditional essence of military competence is leadership of men
in battle. In the past, leadership by and large has been uni-service. Its
development has been based on the idea that clearly defined objectives
will be specified by a superior command. Its action programs—doctrine
and tactics—have been oriented to military goals. It has been the product
of extensive military education and training, and it has been directed
by an organizational structure designed to tie the whole together in
meaningful combat.
The essential character of modern war, however, seems quite
different. First, it tends to be more and more joint in organization,
deployment, staff, and command. Second, it embodies more
comprehensive and centralized direction from the top; limiting,
shaping, and even directing action in the field. Third, it embraces new
leadership patterns, requiring greater technical-managerial competence
on the one hand, yet demanding retention of traditional values on the
other. Fourth, it increasingly is affected by decisionmaking and analysis
techniques that question the utility of traditional staff processes, even
of the staff system itself. Finally, it requires a new breadth and depth of
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understanding and ability in a far broader group of skills—economic,
social, political, military, from the Pentagon to the hamlet.
To achieve these skills, the military education system again must
be summoned to broaden the base of joint knowledge and to expand
the academic programs of the service and joint schools. The education
system also must be looked to for interagency orientation. It must
broaden the corporate sense of the military to include identification with
other agencies that are seeking common goals in their implementation
of the nation’s policies. Education must provide a clearer understanding
of management and leadership techniques in industry, in science, in
business, and in battle. Finally, both education and organization must set
to work to provide the strategy, the tactics, and the doctrine by means of
which the military profession successfully can seek the nation’s changing
goals. If there are suitable substitutes for winning in modern war, these
must be identified early, and communicated clearly to those who face
the crucial task of deciding what the job is, how to go about it, and when
the job is to be done.

Essentiality of the Military

The United States military profession is a product of the liberal
society that it serves. Coming from the liberal social system of the
democracy, changing in attitude as social attitudes in society change, the
military professional reflects his background in the nation’s education
systems, as well as his professional military education and training.
The military professional often sees himself in the Hamiltonian
heritage of nationalism; he has a strong sense of duty, bravery, and
purposeful action for his nation. Traditionally, he regrets that these
cherished values seem to have become obscured, and longs for their
return. But he cannot restore them, he cannot revive them, he cannot
win society to their call. For if he does, he has grown out of his role of
service to the state, and may cease to exist.
Nonetheless, the professional military man, and even his traditional
attitudes, are a necessary ingredient in American society, His is the
voice of caution in the winds of idealistic international argument; the
reminder that although domestically creative, the liberal tradition has
a poor record in foreign policy and national security matters. His is
the voice reminding the nation that wars are fought by people for the
control of people; that men afoot, men on and in the sea, men aloft are
the essential strength of the nation’s security. Above all, in this time of
crisis, he must strive to understand to be understood. Again and again
he must reconsider what it is that makes him and his profession distinctly
military; what he has that others have not. For only by so doing can he
come to a deeper appreciation of the unique contribution that he and his
profession can make to America, and ultimately to all mankind.

